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Abstract
There are many public policy settings in which random assignment of
clients to experimental and control groups is not feasible. I will discuss
one such case, and the alternative method of assignment which was actually
used. The vulnerability of this method to intentional selection bias
will be explored using Markov methods of analysis.
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11. Introduction and Overview
The random assignment of clients to experimental and control groups
is an important and controversial issue in program evaluation. On the
one hand, it is generally accepted that "[A randomized] experimental
design is the research approach most likely to avoid ambiguous findings
and the resultant.. .arguments over interpretation of study results."1
On the other hand, ethical and legal considerations--especially concern
about the propriety of randomly denying a presumably beneficial treatment
to the control group, or subjecting the experimental group to a potentially
harmful one--are frequently an obstacle to the use of randomized designs
in many situations where they might provide useful information.
One example which illustrates the weight being given to such concerns
is the recent Supreme Court ruling on spot checks of automobiles:
The Supreme Court held that a motorist who hasn't
done anything to arouse suspicion can't be stopped at
random [sic] by police for inspection of his driver's
license and auto registration...
While ruling out such stops that leave the choice
of the vehicle up to the "unbridled discretion" of
police, Justice Byron White, writing for the majority,
said states could use other, more systematic methods
to check compliance with traffic-safety regulations.
For instance, he said, "questioning of all oncoming
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible
alternative. "2
Interestingly enough, once we eliminate confusion over the use of the
word "random", a concurring opinion seems to suggest that randomization
would be considered a "more systematic method":
...Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell, while
joining the majority opinion, add that they assumed that
the court would also allow nonrandom [sic--nonarbitrary]
stops other than roadblocks. For instance, they suggested,
stopping every 10th car to pass a given point would
2"equate with" but be "less intrusive than" a 100%
roadblock stop.3
A number of possible ways to resolve such dilemmas over randomiza-
tion have been suggested. For example, many writers have provided
arguments in favor of using randomization wherever possible. Campbell
has pointed out that randomization could be justified as a fair way of
allocating resources in situations of scarcity: "Such decision pro-
cedures as the drawing of lots have had a justly esteemed position since
time immemorial." Campbell and Boruch mention that randomization need
not involve denying services to clients who would otherwise receive them--
-..even if deprivation of treatment were a problem, one could arrange the
use of evaluation budgets in a way that expands rather than decreases
the number of people having access to the program." Gilbert, Light
and Mosteller argue that the ethical problems of randomization may if
anything be overshadowed by the ethical problems of using weaker designs
than are available:
We change our social system...frequently and rather
arbitrarily; that is in ways ordinarily intended to
be beneficial, but with little or no evidence that
the innovation will work. These changes are routinely
made in such an unsystematic way that no one can assess
the consequences of these haphazard adjustments...
The result is that we spend our money, often put people
at risk, and learn little. This haphazard approach is
not "experimenting" with people; instead, it is
fooling around with people.6
Another approach has involved the development of more flexible
alternatives to random assignment, the best known of which are the
quasi-experimental designs proposed by Campbell and Stanley. Although
these designs are a useful contribution in situations where true
3experimental designs are not feasible, they can often yield highly
equivocal results. In particular, the most commonly used quasi-experi-
ment, based on non-equivalent control groups, is extremely weak when the
experimental and control groups differ on attributes closely related to
treatment effectiveness.
Within the area of alternatives to randomization, another promising
path is the development of "semi-random" experimental designs--assign-
ment procedures which incorporate some element of randomness to help
ensure the comparability of experimental and control groups, while per-
mitting systematic flexibility in other respects. Precedents for de-
signs of this type include the old and revered method of stratified
sampling, and "balanced" designs such as those discussed by Blackwell and
Hodges and Efron9, which are designed to yield experimental and control
groups of very nearly the same size. For a discussion of other possible
semi-random designs, see the proposal "New Tools for Comprehensive
Evaluations in Criminal Justice," submitted to LEAA by Larson.10
This paper is concerned with one semi-random design in particular,
that of "random time quota selection," developed and used by the Vera
Institute of Justice in their evaluation of the New York Court Employ-
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ment Project. To sketch the background of this evaluation, "The Court
Employment Project (CEP) diverts defendants from the criminal justice
system, provides them with employment services and leads to a dismissal
of charges for defendants who successfully complete the program."1 2
The Vera Institute of Justice, founded in 1961, is a non-profit
organization which develops and evaluates projects and conducts research,
for the purpose of furthering equal protection under the law for the
indigent.
4Quasi-experimental evaluations of CEP (using non-equivalent control
groups) had been performed, and had yielded somewhat inconclusive results;
it was felt that a true experimental design was the only way to resolve
the remaining uncertainty about the program's effectiveness.
We do not know whether the similarity of rearrest
rates indicates that the Project has no more impact than
normal criminal justice treatment or whether it is a
product of the weakness of the research design. What
is clear, however, is that the only way to find out is
to initiate, after seven years of Project operations,
random assignment experiments.13
However, the Vera Institute's proposed use of random assignment in
their evaluation met with strenuous objections, on the grounds that the
denial of program services to defendants in the control group might vio-
late their rights to equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment) and due
process (Fifth Amendment). The opinion of LEAA's Office of General
Counsel lent additional weight to these objections:
It is generally recognized that a prosecutor is
given wide latitude in exercising his discretion in
determing whether or not to prosecute...However, the
prosecutor's discretion must be based upon a justifi-
able standard...Where a justifiable standard is not
used, the exercise of discretion is arbitrary and
subject to challenge as a denial of equal protection
and due process. In addition, where a classification
is used, it must rest upon real differences which
are relevant to the purpose for which the classifica-
tion is made...
This office is of the opinion that the use of a
random assignment procedure to determine whether or
not to prosecute is not a justifiable standard. The
selection of control group participants is not based
upon real differences. [emphasis added]1 4
5The Vera Institute therefore needed some method of selection which
would provide nearly the same degree of comparability between experimental
and control groups as randomization, while not violating the principle of
selection "based upon a justifiable standard." The method which they
devised to satisfy these requirements--random time quota selection--was
implemented as follows.
The total duration of the evaluation was divided into short time
periods (roughly one to three working days) of random length. Then,
proportional to the length of each time period, a quota was established
for the maximum number of defendants who could be accepted into the pro-
gram (i.e., the experimental group) during that period, based on the
actual (time-averaged) capacity limitations of the program. Those
defendants who were deemed eligible to receive program services, but were
not accepted into the program under this criterion, thus formed the
control group. Since the time periods were relatively short, the ex-
perimental and control groups were in effect chosen concurrently, and it
was expected that the two groups would be largely free of accidental bias
due to fluctuations in the characteristics of the defendant population
over time.
Another dimension along which experimental designs such as the above
may be assessed, in addition to accidental bias, is that of "selection
bias," a term introduced by Blackwell and Hodges:
Suppose an experimenter E wishes to compare the
effectiveness of two treatments, A and B, on a somewhat
vaguely defined population. As individuals arrive, E
decides whether they are in the population, and if he
decides that they are, he administers A or B and notes
6the result...Plainly, if E is aware, before deciding
whether an individual is in the population, which
treatment is to be administered next, he may, not
necessarily deliberately, introduce a bias into the
the experiment. This bias we call selection bias.1 5
In general, selection bias could arise in a number of ways. Perhaps
the most obvious, mentioned by Blackwell and Hodges, is through slight
modifications in the eligibility criteria depending on what the next
assignment is likely to be. An alternative mechanism is to delay the
assignment of particularly favored clients until times when they are
likely to be assigned to the experimental group.
In our case, those with the most access to information about future
assignments--the Vera Institute research staff--had very little opportu-
nity to influence the composition of the experimental group, since the
selection of eligible defendants from which the two groups were drawn was
performed independently by the CEP screening staff, and after that point
the assignment of defendants was completely determined by the experimental
design. However, it is also possible that selection bias might have
occurred during the phase of screening by CEP, since the CEP staff had
access to the outcomes of past assignments, and might have gleaned from
those some information about future assignments.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the vulnerability of random
time quota selection to selection bias in situations similar to the above.
For example, the method of random time quota selection could be used in
evaluating a wide range of programs, provided that clients arrive in a
sequential ("trickle") manner, and that the program is unable to accommodate
all clients determined to be eligible. Thus, the method is likely to meet
7with approval in a variety of criminal justice settings, among others,
due to the legal obstacles which might be encountered by randomized
experiments. The mechanisms by which selection bias might occur would
depend on the particular program being evaluated, but bias can occur in
some form in almost any program, unless screening and assignment pro-
cedures are either completely "blind" or very rigidly specified; for
example, selection bias might be due to the actions of people other than
program staff, such as social workers or other client advocates attempt-
ing to secure program services for their favored clients.
It would certainly be desirable to have some measure of vulnerability
to selection bias--for example, how well one could do in attempting to
intentionally influence program assignments. It would also be very
interesting to explore the dependence of such measures on the exact form
of the distribution for time period lengths. This paper will explore
issues such as the above, in a context not necessarily limited to that
encountered by the Vera Institute.
In Section 2 I will present the basic assumptions of the model used,
and in Section 3 perform some preliminary analysis. Section 4 uses the
techniques of Markov analysis to investigate the behavior of a somewhat
simplified system. Section 5 presents a discussion of the basic results
of Section 4, with several extensions. Finally, in Section 6, I discuss
the implications of my analysis for actual practice.
82. Assumptions Used in the Analysis
In order to perform an analysis of the random time quota selection
method, several assumptions must be made. First, there are a few rela-
tively straightforward or notational points: I have assumed that appli-
cants to the program arrive (in general) according to a Poisson process
with rate X, that time period lengths are independently and identically
distributed according to some probability density function fT(-), and
that the quota for any time period is given by q(.), an integer-valued
function of the length of the period.
More significant are the assumptions with respect to selection bias.
I have assumed that most applicants make no attempt to influence their
selection probabilities--these can be characterized as "naive" applicants.
There is also one "opportunistic" or "gaming" applicant, who will attempt
to time application to the program so as to minimize the probability of
rejection, based on incomplete observation of the system. (Only one
application may be made, a rejection being final.)
Obviously, the gaming applicant must have some knowledge of the
selection method, and some way of making inferences about the state of
the system, in order to calculate the optimal time at which to apply.
With respect to the first issue, I have assumed that the gaming applicant
has complete knowledge of the operating characteristics of the selection
method (i.e., knows the exact forms of the functions fT( -) and q(.) being
used). This will in general be an overestimate of the true state of
knowledge, and so will tend to result in overestimates of vulnerability
to selection bias. (For example, in the Vera Institute case, the CEP
9staff knew the basic principle of random time quota selection, but not
the exact forms of the functions fT(.) and q(.).) This assumption was
adopted for reasons of simplicity--other, possibly more realistic assump-
tions, such as allowing the gaming applicant a Bayesian prior distribution
over the functions fT( -) and q(.), would have complicated the analysis a
great deal.
The final and most questionable assumption involves the gamer's
basis for making inferences about the state of the system. I have per-
mitted the gaming applicant to observe the outcome of exactly one ran-
domly chosen call from the Poisson process, after which the gamer must
calculate the optimal time to apply to the program, given the observed
outcome (rejection or acceptance). The assumption that the call is random-
ly chosen from the stream of all calls is not entirely realistic. A more
plausible scenario might be to assume that the gaming applicant enters
the system at a random time, and then observes the next call to occur.
However, the exact form of the assumption has little influence on the
final results, so I have chosen the assumption for which the analysis is
the simplest.
The limitation that only one call may be observed, on the other
hand, is in fact quite restrictive compared to many plausible scenarios
in which clients or their advocates may have access to a virtually com-
plete history of calls. However, due to the previous assumption about
complete knowledge of fT(-) and q(.), some restriction on the extent of
possible observation is necessary; otherwise, for many reasonable choices
of fT(- ) and q(-), the probability of rejection can be made arbitrarily
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small by continuing to observe until some specified sequence of events
has occurred. For example, if all time periods have merely non-zero quotas,
then waiting until an arbitrarily long time has elapsed with no calls will
bring the probability of rejection arbitrarily close to zero; if all
periods have quotas of at least two, the probability of rejection immedi-
ately after a rejection/acceptance sequence will be exactly zero.
A more realistic way of imposing the needed restriction on the ex-
tent of permitted observation might be to limit the amount of time during
which the favored applicant may observe, by the end of which time an
application must be placed. In this case, the gamer's strategy would be
given by the solution of a continuous-time, probabilistic dynamic program--
to determine, after each observed call, not only the optimal time at
which to call given the observed outcome, but also whether it is worth-
while to postpone calling in the hope of gaining another observation
through an arrival of the Poisson process.
Under the assumption of only one observed call, the gamer would be
interested in determing PRIR(t) and PRIA(t)--the probabilities that a
call placed t time units after the observed call would be rejected,
given that the observed outcome was a rejection or an acceptance, re-
spectively. Possible measures of vulnerability to selection bias would
then be given by
inf PRR(t) inf PRA(t)
t>O R t>O R
and
R R
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where PR is the overall probability of rejection for a randomly chosen
call from the Poisson process. In addition, it would be desirable for
the functions PRR(t) and PRIA(t) to be as close as possible to the
constant value PR' so that less optimal attempts at influencing selection
probabilities would also have little effect.
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3. Analysis of the General Case
Although one can derive general renewal formulas for the probabilities
PRIR(t) and PRIA(t), it is not possible to obtain anything even remotely
resembling closed-form results for general fT( ) and q(). Therefore,
rather than presenting the long and cumbersome derivations for the pro-
babilities of interest, which involve infinite sums of convolutions. I
will instead present a simpler derivation, selected because it clearly
illustrates some of the difficulties involved--PR, the probability that
a randomly chosen call will be rejected. (In practice, PR will usually
be a specified decision variable of the system, with fT ( -) and q(-)
being chosen to yield the desired value of PR; however, the analysis
below will still hold.)
PR= Pa randomly chosen call will be rejectedi
E[number of rejections in a time period] =
E[total number of calls in a time period]
0 m-Xtoo (Xtme- dt(t) dtfT(t) (m-q(t)) 
0 mq(t)+l
f fT(t) m (t)met dtf m~=0 Mdt
00  (Xt)me- Xt
m=q(t)+l 
0
XE[T]
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to simplify this formula
and express the desired probability in closed form. The fundamental
difficulty is that, at this level of generality in fT(.) and q(-), the
system has too much "memory." The number of acceptances so far in the
13
current time period, when taken together with the amount of time already
elapsed, provides a great deal of information about the time remaining
in the period. To put it another way, noting that the beginnings of new
time periods constitute the renewals of the system, the difficulty is that
the distribution function for the time until the next renewal, starting
with the system in some arbitrary state, is too complicated to be an-
alytically tractable.
Therefore, the aim of systematically exploring the relationship be-
tween vulnerability to selection bias and the form of the function fT( )
can not be met in the way we had originally intended. There are several
alternative approaches which are still of interest, however:
1) Making the necessary simplifying assumptions to "Markovize" the
system, so that the information available at any given time can be
adequately represented by one of a discrete of states.
2) Attempting to derive useful approximations for particular choices
of fT( ) and q(').
3) Investigating the behavior of the system numerically, again for
particular choices of fT(') and q(.). (Note that since the expressions
for PRIR(t) and PRIA(t) involve infinite sums of convolutions, this
approach is not necessarily straightforward. The work of Kielson and
Nunn, on numerical convolution via Laguerre transforms, might be useful
here. )
*)Under items 2) and 3), it would be particularly desirable to con-
centrate on choices of f () and q(.) which would be appropriate in actual
application of the method. The most reasonable choices would be to let
q() be roughly linear, and to experiment with various discrete distri-
butions for the time period lengths, with the aim of finding a distri-
bution for which PRJR(t) and PRIA(t) were relatively close to the constant
value P R' R~~~{{
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In this paper I have chosen to Markovize. However, I believe that
the other approaches mentioned are also quite promising, and am interest-
ed in pursuing one or more of these in the future.
The assumptions necessary to Markovize the system are as follows.
First, the distribution for the lengths of time periods must be without
memory. Note that the geometric distribution is not memoryless in this
context, since time is not discrete--the arrival process takes place
continuously over time. Therefore the basic choice for fT( -) is exponen-
tial. By viewing each time period as being made up of a fixed number of
exponential stages, the Markov analysis presented here can also be ex-
tended to permit Erlang-distributed and other, more general time periods;
this extension will be discussed further in a later section of this paper.
The second, and more limiting required assumption is that the quota
q(t) must be a constant, independent of t. To illustrate the need for
this assumption, consider the following example. Suppose that q(t) were
not constant, but instead were roughly proportional to t--say, q(t) =
[2t] (rounded down), so that a time period five units in length would
have a quota of ten acceptances. Then, if during the first two units
of a time period we had already observed ten acceptances, the period
would have to last at least another three time units, since its quota
must have been at least ten. Thus, a system with proportional or other
varying quotas is not without memory--the number of acceptances by a
given time in the current period can contain a great deal of information
on the time remaining in that period.
At first glance, it may appear that these Markovizing assumptions--
15
particularly with respect to constant quotas--are so restrictive as to
render the resulting system trivial and uninteresting. This is in fact
not the case; the analysis of the simplified system still yields fairly
interesting results, and may give some feeling for the behavior of random
time quota selection under more general assumptions.
The limitations that do exist are more in the realm of practical
application. The use of constant quotas would greatly diminish the per-
suasive advantages of this method over randomization, since the notion of
limited capacity would no longer be emphasized quite so explicitly; also,
the use of continuous-length time periods might be difficult to implement
in some situations. These objections confirm the potential value of the
alternative approaches discussed earlier in this section.
16
4. Analysis of the Markovized System
To proceed with the analysis of the Markovized system, let the time
periods be exponentially distributed with mean length l/y, let the quota
be fixed at k acceptances per time period, and define the state of the
system to be the total number of acceptances which have occurred so far
in the current period. We can then draw the following simple state
transition diagram:
X
There are two types of events represented here. The start of a new
time period occurs with rate y, and returns the system to state 0, inde-
pendent of its previous state. The arrival of a new applicant to the
program occurs with rate , and increments the state of the system, un-
less there have already been k acceptances in the current period, in
which case the new applicant is rejected and the state of the system
remains unchanged.
This state transition diagram can then be converted to a flow graph,
using either semi-Markov or continuous-time Markov formulations, by the
appropriate relabeling of the arcs and the inclusion of "tap-outs."1 7
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Here I have chosen the semi-Markov formulation. Although that choice
was not necessary, since all events occur exponentially, it permits a
clear representation of the self-transitions at states 0 and k.
1
X+y+s
y
A+y+s X+y+s
Defining our notation, let:
--Pij be the probability that the next event will result in a
transition (or self-transition) to state j, given that the
system is currently in state i;
--wi(.) be the probability density function of the waiting time
until the next transition, given that the system is currently
in state i; and
--h..(-) be the probability density function of the holding
13
time for a transition from i to j (i.e., the waiting time
in state i, given that the next transition is to state j).
'+s
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Then we have, by the properties of the exponential distribution,
that:
1)
P =
Y 0 0
X+y X+y
_Y X O
x+ h+y0 .. . 0X+Y X+y
Y . . .
Y A
A+y 0 x
iO A+y i' ii+l + i<k, kk = and i= 0 otherwise).
All events occur exponentially, so of the two types, the probability that
the next to occur will be an arrival is + ; correspondingly, the pro-
bability that the next event will be the start of a new time period is
Y
A+Y 
2) wi(t) = (X+y)e (A+Y)t Vi. The waiting time in state i until
the next transition is the time until either an arrival or the start
of a new time period, whichever occurs first; the distribution for the
minimum of two exponential random variables is itself exponential, with
mean rate equal to the sum of the original rates.
3) hij(t) = (y)e (X+Y)t i,j. Since transitions occur ex-
ponentially, the distribution for the holding time until the next transi-
tion from state i, given that it will be to state j, is the same as for
the unconditional waiting time in state i.
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Thus, each arc in the above flow graph has been labeled with the
e e
expression pijhije(s), for appropriate values of i and j, where hij (s)
denotes the Laplace transform of hij (t). Similarly, the tap-out from
state i has been labeled with ccwi.(s), where Ccwi(t) is the probability
I 1
that the waiting time in state i is greater than t (i.e., the com-
plementary cumulative of wi(t)).
The next step is to find the functions ij ( ), where ij (t) is the
probability that the system is in state j t time units from now, given
that it is currently in state i. To do this, we can either apply the
techniques of flow graph analysis directly, to find ij (s) for each pair
of i and j, or we can use the matrix formula
oe(s) = [I-PD He()]- ccWe(s)
whereccWe(s) is a diagonal matrix with on-diagonal elements equal to
CCwie(s), He(s) = (hije(s)), and[O represents the term-by-term matrix
product (i.e., if A=(aij) and B=(bij), then A[3B=(aijbij)).
The resulting matrix e (s) has the following form:
1 <i
20
I will not invert these transforms here. The results are somewhat
messy (the most complicated expression--for ik(t), i > 1--involves the
cumulative distribution function for the sum of an Erlangk(+y) random
variable and an exponential(X) random variable), and would not be highly
meaningful, since we are not interested in the functions ij (t) for their
own sake in any case. Instead, using the expressions for ije(s), I will
derive expressions for PRIR(t) and PRIA(t), the functions that our gaming
applicant was originally interested in.
First we will need to find the steady-state probabilities, r(j):
T(j) = sij () Is= 0 Vi
¥t xA+¥ ( X~) 0 ° < j < k-l
(%)k j=k
(Because the arrival process is Poisson, the value (j) is not only the
probability of being in state j at a random time, but also the probability
that a randomly chosen call from the process arrives while the system is
in state j.)
eR(s) is now relatively simple to compute, since the observed call
will be rejected only if it occurs while the system is in state k, and
the state of the system therefore will not change as a result of the call:
e (kkk(s) =) +y
(k) s(y+s) (-Iy+s y+sPRJ R (S (k) s(Y+s) ~~s +
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Inverting we get:
tk k-
-yt Xv -Xv -YV -yt
PRIR(t) = e + (k-l) e (e -e )dv
0
PRjAe(s) is somewhat more complicated, since we must take into
account the facts that the observed call might arrive while the system
is in any of states 0,1,...,k-1, and that its acceptance would increment
the state of the system:
e k-ie
R|A (s) = i =O (i+l,k (s)
k-l
i-O 1(i)
i=o LY 'X+y s(y+s) X++s k
k-1 y A% i
i=0
k-l Y x X u A~rXi ~~ ' k-i-l]
k-l y X i
i-=O
= _ X k 1 _ % y A k-l
s(y+s)A +¥+ 1 + i sY+s) X+k+sl1- (-7)
+ y Y A k-l+1 ( k- l
+s X+y Xy s y+S %- 
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Inverting gives
Xk k-1
J(k-l)!
0
e- v (e-yVe-yt)
e (e -e )
(X k-1
dv+ X+y
1- (X+y)
t
i k-lvk-2
0 (k-2) !
e-Xv (e-yv-e-yt) dv
X
(k.= 1): +Y -( +y) t
X+Y
(k > 2): 1 i- t
_ 1
1- (#py
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5. Interpretation of Results
Since the expressions for PRiR(t) and PRIA(t) are quite unwieldy,
I will also present a variety of simpler results which help to give some
qualitative understanding of the system's behavior. First, it is in-
structive to look at the expressions for the special case k=l (a quota of
one acceptance per time period), since they are then simple exponential
functions, and the characteristics of the system are therefore particularly
clear in this case.
When k=l, PRIR(t) and PRIA(t) are identical, as indeed we might have
expected. With only one acceptance per time period, an observed call--
whether accepted or rejected--can communicate only that the system
will be in the rejection state immediately after the observation. In
other words, the only information available about the state of the system
through observation of calls is the knowledge that a call actually
occurred at some given time. In keeping with this reasoning, evaluating
either PRiR(t) or PRIA(t) at k=l gives
P + Y e-(+¥)t
PR(t) PRIR(t) =l PRIA(t)t I=l X+y X+y
Graphing this function, we get:
PR(t)
A
X-ty
t1 _
I - - -  - - - - - - . -
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Although it is not as easy to qualitatively describe the behavior
of PRjR(t) and PRIA(t) when k=2, some observations can be made about the
shapes of these functions. For example, PRiR(t) is monotonically de-
creasing in t, as can be shown by differentiating:
d R(t) = ye-Yt 1 vk- e-v dv
dt RJR (k-l)!
%t k k-1
_ye-¥t f v -]v
-  J (k-l)! eX  dv < 0 t
t
We are certain to be rejected if a new time period has not yet started
since the observed rejection, but have a smaller probability of rejection
if the system is in a new period,, and the probability that the system. is
still in the same time period as the observed rejection obviously de-
creases over time.
PRIA(t), on the other hand, is at least initially increasing for
k > 2:
d
dt PRIAt ) I
k
t=O 1- (-)
X+y
0
When k > 2 we can also show that PRIA(t) is
than PRiR(t):
A() () k-
PRIA(t) - PR[R(t) = - - 1
%k-1 v
k-2
k-l k-2
1-( X k (k-2)! e
always strictly less
- X e-Y
A+Y -
-Xv(e-YV-e-Yt)dv - eYt
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X~~~y  -~vXr X+y'
1 ! % hk-i k-2
e (e- e-ytX k(k-2)!
1- (-k k
x+Y +
1 X k-l
(X k =+y
- f X v -(X+Y)vdv
(k-2) e
t k-i k-21 -yt - x v -v
X k e'~ 1 .f (k-2) V v1
1-(%~¥) k e X'y - Jyv
1 ok-1 k2 k-i k-2
_____ x X v -(X+y)v x v _Xv _Ytdv
(X k f (k-2)! - v (k-2)! e e dvl-( ~~~~~t
Since e Yt > eYV when t < v, this gives us the inequality
X k k- k-2
PR|A=t) R|R 1-(^ itv e-V(e-YV-e Yt)dv < O
1-(-) t
The intuitive justification for this result is as follows. Under
the assumption of independently distributed time period lengths, the
outcome of an observed call contains no information about the pro-
bability of rejection once a new time period has started. However, if
the system is still in the period during which the observation took
place, its outcome does make a difference: calls are sure to be re-
jected after an observed rejection, but have some probability of
acceptance after an observed acceptance (if k > 2).
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Further intuition can be gained by looking at PRIR(t) and PRIA(t) at
t=O (actually t=O , assuming our gaming applicant calls immediately after
the observed call), and in the limit as t- +o (assuming an arbitrarily
long delay after the observed call). We would expect that PRJR(0 ), the
probability of rejection immediately after an observed rejection, would
equal one, since it is not possible for a new period to have begun in
between the two calls, and in fact evaluating PRIR(t)It=O gives the
desired result. PRIA(0) is given by
y X k-l
X+-y X+y ) = (k-l)
- k 1-r (k)
the probability that our observed call was the last acceptance in its
time period, given that it was accepted at all.
After an arbitrarily long time, we would expect the observed out-
come to have become uninformative, since the system will have returned
to steady state. Thus we have that a call placed t time units after an
observed call, in the limit as t ->+ , has the same rejection probability
as if it were randomly timed:
li P R(t) = lim PRA(t) X k
Finally, we can attempt to calculate our measures of vulnerability
to selection bias,
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inf PR (t) inf p (t )
t > 0 RIR and t R IA
PR PR
Since PRIR(t) is monotonically decreasing,
inf p= r R(t = 
t > 0 RI(t) t + PRIR(t) = (X+Y)
which is also equal to the probability that a randomly chosen naive
applicant is rejected, PR' I was not able to determine
t>inf PR IA(t) for k > 2,
as it is not possible to analytically find the zeroes of
d PRA(t) = e-Yt f k vk-l 
dt I 0 (k-l)! e dv
XW -kit~ 1t k-l k-2
+ (X )kye 1 ekYt f (k-2)! e
l-( ) 0 -(+j) 0
However, the needed computations could easily be performed numerically
for specific values of , y, and k.
It is important to note the somewhat peculiar fact that, when k=l
and/or when the observed call is a rejection, our gaming applicant can do
no better than PR' the overall probability of rejection for naive appli-
cants. This result is not as paradoxical as it at first appears, since
in both of these situations the information provided by the observed call
consists only of the knowledge that the system has entered the rejection
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state. However, the fact that situations exist in which the gaming
applicant is completely incapable of reducing the probability of rejection
from the program points up the unrealistically severe restrictions we
have imposed on possible gaming behavior. It is important to investigate
the effect on selection bias of various means of relaxing those re-
strictions.
One possible relaxation is to permit the gamer to apply to the pro-
gram before the arrival of the observation call. This is desirable from
the gamer's perspective, since if no calls have yet arrived a long while
after the gamer has entered the system, the probability of rejection for
an application placed at that time will be very low. If s is the time
elapsed with no arrivals since the gaming applicant has entered the
system, then the probability of rejection for an application placed at
time s is given by the probability that the gamer entered the system in
state k, times the probability that a new time period has not yet begun:
[X )k eYt
Under this model, the gamer weighs the chance of a decreased pro-
bability of rejection by delaying application, against the risk of an
increased rejection probability if the observation call arrives before
application to the program has been made. The optimal strategy is to
apply t time units after arrival to the system if an observation call
has not yet occurred, and an arbitrarily long time after the observation
call if it occurs before t , where t is chosen to minimize
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k -)t observation call does
lrejection; = (-X) e P not occur by t
0 I I+ Xe-Xs (k) -Ys[ inf p M ds
t
+ e-X s 1 - r(k)eY [if PRA( )]d
As an example, for k=l, this becomes
Plrejection = (X)[e (X+Y)t + (1 - eYt).
Differentiating with respect to t gives
(X) [Xe- - (X+Y)e (X+Y)t = 0,
* 1 X
implying that t = n ( )
Y X+y
Another possible relaxation of the permitted gaming behavior, which
might be a realistic model for many situations, is to assume that the
gaming applicant is actually the favored client of some (gaming) client
advocate, who is responsible for some amount X0 of the total arrival rate A.
Under this model, the gaming applicant arrives at the client advocate, and
observes the outcome of the next applicant to arrive at that advocate.
Since the only possible arrivals from the time the gaming applicant
enters the system to the time of the observation are from a Poisson process
with rate X - X0, the probability that the observation call will arrive
with the system in state i is given by
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' (j) = f ( 0eO t) O Tr(i) [ij (t)]X_ dt
0 0
Then, assuming that the client advocate does not place any further
calls until the optimally timed call on behalf of the favored applicant,
the effective arrival rate between the observation call and the call on
behalf of the gaming applicant is again only A-XO. Thus, the probability
of rejection t time units after the observed call, given that the observed
call is rejected, will be [kk(t)] x ; if the observed call is accepted,
the probability of rejection t time units later will be
k-l
z ' (i) [i+lsk(t) ]X-Xi=0 -0
k-l
Z i'(i)
i=0
The probability of the gaming applicant being rejected t time units
after the observed call, both in the case when the observed call is re-
jected and when k=l, is given by
-(t)] yt -+ Xx0) v (X-X )v -v -Yt[0(t e + f (k-l)! e 0 (e -e )dv.
0 0
This is minimized in the limit as t + , yielding an optimum rejection
probability of
X 0 k
Oa
compared to (X)k for naive applicants. Thus, the ratio
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P a client advocate with
t arrival rate 0O M kJy]
R 0+
will not be too much less than one when:
- S0 is small relative to A;
- the average period length, l/y, is
small relative to ; and
- k is small.
One additional extension--which is not related to our assumptions
about gaming behavior, but can be performed fairly simply--is the gener-
alization of the Markov analysis to allow Erlang and other, more general
distributions for the lengths of time periods. This can be accomplished
by viewing each period as being made up of a number of exponential stages,
possibly with different parameters. (In fact, the number of stages does
not even need to be fixed. Rather, at the end of stage i, one could
continue to stage i+l with probability Pi, or terminate the current time
period with probability 1-pi, permitting the representation of an ex-
tremely wide range of continuous distributions.)
As an example, here is the state transition diagram for a system
with two stages, having mean lengths 1/y1 and 1/y2:
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x X A X
X
A
The methods of analysis for this system would be parallel to those
used in Section 4 of this paper, although the algebra would obviously be
more complicated. I will present a sample computation here for illustrative
purposes--PR, the probability of rejection for a naive applicant.
First, examining the result for the simpler system,
P = ( X )k
R X+y
we see that it is equal to the probability of having k arrivals before the
start of a new time period. (The probability that one arrival will occur
before a new period begins is given by A, and given that one such
event has occurred, the probability of the next one occurring remains un-
changed.) By analogy, then, in our system we will have
PR = P k arrivals before the completion of the 1st stagei
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+ i_O Pl i arrivals before the completion of the 1st stage
x'P completion of the 1st stage before the next arrivali
x P k-i arrivals before the completion of the 2nd stagef]
- (A)k + () il % k-i
X+y X+y A+y X+y )
i=O 1 1 2
Y1 X k Y2 X k
- ( -) -+1 Y Y2 
¥7¥2 +Y2 1 y 2 +y1 _
yk +Y
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6. Summary and Conclusions
I set out in this paper to explore the vulnerability to selection
bias of random time quota selection, as developed by the Vera Institute.
In the course of pursuing that analysis, an increasing number of assump-
tions and restrictions became necessary, and it was not possible to in-
vestigate the method of random time quota selection in as much generality
as was hoped. In this section, I will review the assumptions that were
made, and present my views on which aspects of the analysis remain appli-
cable in broader contexts. I will also mention once again several direc-
tions for further research which were discussed earlier in the paper.
The first set of assumptions was made prior to the investigation of
the general case. Primary among these were:
1) that there was only one gaming applicant;
2) that the gamer had complete knowledge of the system
characteristics fT( ) and q(.); and
3) that only one call could be observed.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the first assumption on the
magnitude of possible selection bias, although one can hope that it is
not too great. If a number of applicants attempted to time their appli-
cations so as to influence their selection probabilities, this would be
perceived by any one applicant as a non-Poisson process for arrivals
(with arrivals not necessarily mutually independent). The effect might
be comparable in size to that of a different distribution for time period
lengths.
Assumptions 2) and 3) are obviously central to the analysis. For
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example, it was demonstrated that, given complete knowledge of system
characteristics, failure to limit the extent of permitted observation can
lead to extreme selection bias, with rejection probabilities often arbi-
trarily close to zero. In general, the assumptions chosen tend to counter-
act each other in their effects: the severe restriction on permitted ob-
servation was intended to offset the generosity in overall knowledge of
the system.
Because of these two assumptions, the analysis that I have presented
is clearly not an accurate model for most practical settings. However,
the discussion above leads to a recommendation on how to reduce selection
bias in general. In situations where clients or their advocates have
access to a great deal of information about previous calls, it is especially
important to provide only minimal information on the details of the selec-
tion method; similarly, in situations where there is a great deal of know-
ledge about the system in general, such as where the researchers deal
directly with program applicants, an effort should be made to limit the
possibilities for observing the outcomes of calls.
The next set of assumptions was made in order to Markovize the system.
Certainly,few implementations of random time quota selection are likely to
use the precise configuration we considered--constant quotas, and ex-
ponentially (or Erlang) distributed time period lengths. In general, I
would conjecture that implementations similar to the memoryless system
analyzed here would tend to minimize selection bias, precisely because of
the Markov property: there is relatively little information to be gained
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through observation. However, this hypothesis should definitely be in-
vestigated further before being taken as a recommendation. It is especially
important to understand the effects of proportional rather than constant
quotas, since proportional quotas are virtually essential in winning
approval for the method in many contexts.
Further insight into the effect of observation opportunities on
selection bias is provided by one of the extensions considered in this
paper. The result (for the Markovized system), for an advocate who is
responsible for an amount X0 of the total arrival rate X, is that the
probability of rejection for a gaming applicant can be reduced by a factor
of
from the probability with more restricted information.
Here again, general recommendations can be made. Selection bias can
be reduced by giving each advocate access to only a small proportion of
all call!--for example, by having advocates work out of separate offices
rather than as a group, where possible. Also, shorter time periods will
tend to reduce selection bias, as might be expected, since the system will
more closely approximate true randomization. Finally, while small quotas
appear to minimize worst-case selection bias, they may also increase the
overall variability in rejection probabilities among different times of
application to the program: for k=l the functions PRIR(t) and PRIA(t)
are exponential, whereas for larger k they are "flatter" (similar to the
cumulative distribution functions for Erlang random variables).
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To review what I consider to be the most important recommendations
to be followed in minimizing selection bias, the most obvious is that
time periods should be chosen to permit the use of quite small quotas.
The smaller the quotas are, the more closely the system mimics the be-
havior of true randomization. The other important guideline is to limit
the extent of possible observation a great deal. If it is not possible
to withhold information or outcomes (acceptance or rejection) from the
client advocates, efforts should be made to limit observation opportuni-
ties in other ways--for example, by delaying the reporting of outcomes,
by decentralizing client advocate operations so that each advocate observes
only a small fraction of calls, etc.
In sum, the results of this paper, taken together with the experiences
of the Vera Institute in successfully implementing random time quota selec-
tion, indicate that with care the method can be used as an alternative
to random selection without incurring undue selection bias. However,
further research would be extremely useful in clarifying the properties of
the method. Perhaps the most promising avenue for research is the numerical
solution of the general renewal equations discussed in Section 3, to per-
mit investigation of the influence of proportional quotas. It would also
be extremely worthwhile to develop and explore the variant of random time
quota selection described earlier, in which calls would be accepted during
a certain proportion of each time period, rather than according to fixed
quotas.
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